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Abstract 
 
Non-linear public debt adjustment and structural breaks in fiscal policy may affect 
tests of public debt sustainability. Existing studies address these issues separately. No 
study has considered both. We address this gap by focusing on Greece, one of the 
most highly-indebted EMU countries. We find evidence of previously undetected 
non-linear fiscal adjustment; and two structural breaks in fiscal policy. Excluding 
these from the analysis, or allowing for non-linearities only, affects the nature of the 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Whether public debt is sustainable or not is an issue of significance. Sound public 
finances are thought to be favouring economic growth by contributing to price 
stability through minimizing inflationary seignorage; allowing reduction in distortion-
causing taxation; and yielding investment-inducing low real interest rates. An 
unsustainable fiscal position implies that at some point in the future, the government 
will have to take corrective measures. Uncertainty about the timing and the form of 
these measures could harm economic growth by preventing optimal investment 
decisions. Institutional arrangements like the fiscal rules to which individual US state 
budgets are expected to adhere to, or the budget restrictions imposed on EMU 
members by the Budget and Stability Pact are based on such concerns.1  
 
In recent years, a growing empirical literature testing the validity of the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) has developed. Many papers conclude that the 
IBC is violated.2 However, these findings may be due to biases in the testing 
procedure. First, public debt may present non-linear behaviour. This is related to 
Bohn’s (1998) hypothesis that governments are likely to respond more vigorously to 
budget deficits when fiscal imbalances are large rather than small. Second, fiscal 
policy may be subject to structural breaks. Both factors may result in traditional tests 
of public debt sustainability being biased towards rejecting sustainability.  
                                                          
1 See the Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam, 17th June 
1997, and the joint European Commission-European Council Report to the Stockholm European 
Council of March 2001. For a recent discussion of fiscal rules in EMU, see, among others, Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1998) and Brunila et al (2001).  
2 The majority of these studies focus on the USA, for which Hamilton’s and Flavin’s initial 
contribution in 1986 was followed by the studies of Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Kremers (1989), 
Wilcox (1989), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Quintos (1995), Bohn (1998) and Sarno 
(2001). Other studies include Corsetti and Roubini (1991) on OECD countries, Buiter and Patel (1992) 
on India, de Haan and Siermann (1993) on the Netherlands, and Makrydakis et al (1999) on Greece.   
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The existing literature has largely overlooked these issues. These are addressed by a 
handful of papers only. Non-linear fiscal adjustment is modelled by Bohn (1998) and 
Sarno (2001), whereas structural breaks are examined by Ahmed and Rogers (1995), 
Quintos (1995) and Makrydakis et al (1999). By addressing one of the two possible 
sources of bias, the findings of these papers are superior to those that address none. 
However, non-linear behaviour and structural breaks, can individually lead to false 
rejection of the sustainability hypothesis. By accounting only for one of the two, these 
papers do not remove the risk of bias altogether. To achieve this, non-linear 
adjustment and structural breaks must be modelled simultaneously. Up to now, such 
an analysis has not been carried out.  
 
In this paper we address this gap by focusing on Greece, a heavily-indebted EMU 
country whose high debt-level has prompted the European Commission (2001, pp. 39-
41) to consider special fiscal rules, different to those applying to the rest of the EMU 
countries, according to which Greece should “rigorously adhere” to the target of a 
structurally-balanced budget “at all times”.3 The extend of discussion, and the 
unusually direct language used in the Commission’s Report, suggests that this is an 
issue of importance beyond the narrow Greek perspective, as it relates directly to the 
conduct of the single monetary policy on behalf of the European Central Bank.4 The 
issue of sustainability recently returned to the forefront of public debate, in the light 
of the proposed reforms of the Budget Stability Pact. In this debate, which is currently 
ongoing, emphasis seems to shift from the level of government deficits to the level of 
public debt, particularly in relation to heavily indebted countries like Greece.   
 
                                                          
3 Belgium and Italy are the other two EMU countries included in this proposal.  
4 For a detailed discussion on this point, see European Commission 2001 (pp. 109-201).  
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Public debt sustainability in Greece has previously been examined by Corsetti and 
Roubini (1991) and Makrydakis et al (1999), both of which found Greek public debt 
to be unsustainable. However, none of the two allowed for non-linear fiscal 
adjustment. Regarding structural breaks, Corsetti and Roubini did not consider them 
at all, whereas Makrydakis et al address them using the test of Zivot and Andrews 
(1992). This allows for a single break only, which Makrydakis et al find in 1978. But 
this single-break hypothesis may be invalid. Figure 1 presents the movements of the 
discounted debt-to-GDP series in Greece,5 for the period 1970-2000.6  The figure 
suggests fiscal stability in the 1970s, followed by a worsening of the fiscal outlook in 
the 1980s and a partial recovery in the 1990s. Therefore, Greek public debt may have 
been subject to multiple structural breaks and non-linear adjustment. This is precisely 
the kind of complex fiscal environment for which the existing literature does not 
account and where traditional sustainability tests, or tests addressing sources of 
potential bias only partially, may yield misleading inference.  
 
Our empirical approach allows for both non-linear fiscal adjustment and multiple 
structural breaks in fiscal policy, which we identify endogenously. In doing so, we 
obtain a number of interesting new findings. We find evidence in favour of Bohn’s 
                                                          
5 We follow the standard way to calculate the discounted market value of the debt-to-GDP series which 
in period t is defined as 
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ρ is the discount factor, taking the value of 1 for 1970, D is the level of public 
debt and Y the level of GDP, so that D/Y is the undiscounted public debt to GDP ratio. Real interest 
rates are calculated ex-post, and are defined as the difference between the discount rate of the Bank of 
Greece and the GDP deflator growth rate. To calculate ex-post real interest rates, we would ideally like 
to use yields on long-term government bonds rather than discount rates, but such a series was not 
available for the whole of the post-1970 period. The series for the discount rate is taken by the 
International Financial Statistics Databank provided by Datastream. The rest of the variables are 
obtained by the European Commission Databank provided by Datastream.   
6 For a review of Greek fiscal policy over the past three decades, see Christodoulakis (1994), 
Alogoskoufis (1995) and Mourmouras and Arghyrou, (2000).   
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hypothesis, with Greek authorities correcting large deficits more vigorously than 
small ones. We also find evidence of two, rather than one, structural breaks in Greek 
fiscal policy, the second of which suggests that the convergence programmes 
implemented in the 1990s have had a beneficial effect on Greek public debt 
sustainability. Augmenting traditional tests by accounting only for non-linearities 
results in rejecting sustainability. By contrast, incorporating both non-linearity and 
structural breaks results in accepting sustainability. This stands in contrast to the 
conclusion of the existing studies on Greece, and highlights the bias risks involved in 
existing studies allowing for none or only one of the two possible sources of bias. We 
conclude that Greek public debt is sustainable.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses our 
methodology. Section 3 presents our empirical results. In particular, section 3.1 
presents standard tests of debt sustainability. Section 3.2 repeats the analysis allowing 
for non-linear fiscal adjustment. Section 3.3 tests for sustainability accounting for 
structural breaks in Greek fiscal policy. Section 3.4 estimates a general model of 
fiscal adjustment allowing both for structural breaks and non-linearities. Finally, 
Section 4 summarises and offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. TESTING METHODOLOGIES   
 
2.1. Benchmark tests  
 
Standard tests of public debt sustainability are based on the one-period government 
budget constraint given by:  
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Dt+1 = (1+ρ) Dt + gt – rt                                                     (1) 
 
In (1), D is the level of public debt, ρ the real interest rate, g real government 
expenditure excluding interest payments and r real government revenue, including 
seignorage. Taking expectations in (1) and using recursive forward substitution 
yields:  
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Equation (2) is the government intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). It states that 
the outstanding stock of government debt equals the sum of the (discounted) present 
values of expected primary surpluses, plus the limit value of debt at some terminal 
future date. For public debt to be sustainable, the limit term should converge to zero:  
 
lim 0)1( 1
)1( =+ +++−→∝ jtjtj DE ρ        (3) 
 
Equation (3) has mainly been tested using two methodologies. The first, proposed by 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and used, among others, by Kremers (1988), Wilcox 
(1989), Haug (1991) and Corsetti and Roubini (1991), is to apply unit root tests on the 
series of discounted market value of public debt. Sustainability implies a stationary 
debt process without deterministic components. The second, initially suggested by 
Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991), is based upon the 
proposition that for the stock of debt to converge to zero, the value of its flow 
component, i.e. the government’s budget deficit, must on average be zero. Let us 
define Rt to be real government revenue (including seignorage) and Gt real 
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government expenditure (inclusive of interest). If Rt and Gt are both I(1), then, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the budget deficit, (Gt–Rt), to be reverting to 
zero is equation (4) below to be cointegrated, with the cointegrating vector taking the 
form [1, 0, -1], and ut being a white-noise error term. 7    
 
Rt = α + βGt + ut                     (4) 
 
Equation (4) can be estimated using a variety of ways. In the estimations that follow, 
we use the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator, which is asymptotically equivalent to 
Johansen’s (1988) maximum-likelihood estimator and is known to have a superior 
performance in small samples like ours (Stock and Watson, 1993; Saikkonen, 1991).8 
Since our system is bivariate, the issue of multi-cointegration does not arise. The 
DOLS regression is given by equation (5) below: 
 
Rt = α  + β Gt + ∑
−=
−∆
k
ki
iti Gγ + ut                                                                                  (5) 
 
Equation (5) augments the standard OLS estimator by adding a number of lead and 
lag differences of the regressors.9 These control for any endogenous feedback from 
the dependent to the independent variables and result in consistent estimates of the 
                                                          
7 Quintos (1995), defines this to be the “strong-form” sustainability condition. She also derives another 
form of sustainability, defined as “weak-form” sustainability, which only requires β to be different than 
zero. However, she acknowledges that the absence of strong-form sustainability has important policy 
implications, as in the presence of weak-form sustainability the government will face problems in 
marketing its debt. In this paper we focus on the traditional (strong-) form of sustainability, which is 
more relevant to the policy issues discussed in the introduction section.  
8 In subsequent estimations we check the robustness of our findings using the Johansen estimator. To 
preserve space, the Johansen estimates are not reported but are available upon request.  
9 Note that the order of difference required for each regressor in generating the lead and lag term 
depends on the order of integration of the corresponding regressor. For example, if a regressor is I(2) 
then the lead and lag terms must be differenced twice (i.e., ∆(∆xt)). For further details see Stock and 
Watson (1993). 
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cointegrating vectors, even under conditions of two-way exogeneity between the left- 
and right-hand side terms (see Ahmed and Rogers 1995, p.361). The estimated co-
integrating vector is given by CVt = Rt − α − βGt, which is interpreted as a measure of 
fiscal disequlibrium. If the term ut in (5) presents autocorrelation, we use the Dynamic 
Generalised LS (DGLS) estimator that allows for an autoregressive error using 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares. We test the cointegration hypothesis between Rt 
and Gt applying unit root tests on CVt. Linear restrictions on the cointegrating 
parameters are then tested using a Wald test, which is χ2-distributed with one degree 
of freedom. Failure to obtain cointegration results in rejecting the sustainability 
hypothesis.  
 
If Rt are Gt are cointegrated the Granger representation theorem applies, and short-run 
fiscal adjustment can be modelled using an Error Correction Model (ECM) like (6): 
 
∆Rt = k + ∑ ∑
= =
−− ∆+∆
k
i
m
j
jtiiti GR
1 1
δγ + ζ CVt-1 + νt     (6) 
 
In (6) ∆ is the first difference operator, CV the estimated cointegrating vector 
obtained by (5) and νt  a random error term. Hence, a third way to test for public debt 
sustainability is to estimate (6) and test whether ζ  is significant or not. A non-
significant ζ parameter suggests lack of cointegration between Rt and Gt and results in 
rejecting the sustainability hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 8
2.2 Tests and models of non-linear fiscal adjustment  
 
Bohn (1998) argued that governments tend to respond more vigorously to budget 
deficits when the level of debt is high rather than low. If such non-linear debt 
dynamics exist, standard tests like those discussed above are biased towards rejecting 
sustainability (Sarno, 2001).  
 
The hypothesis of non-linear debt adjustment can be tested using the procedure 
described in Saikonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al (1988), Granger and 
Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994). This involves estimating 
 
tuˆ = γ00+ ( )∑
=
−−−−−−− +++
φ γγγγ
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2
210 ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ
j
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where tuˆ  can be defined as the discounted debt-to-GDP ratio, or the estimated fiscal 
disequilibrium obtained by equation (5); d is the delay parameter of the transition 
function to be used and v(t) ∼ niid (0,σ2). Linearity implies the null hypothesis H0: 
[γ 1j = γ2j = γ3j =γ 4 =γ 5 = 0] for all j ∈(1,2...φ).  This can be tested using an LM-type 
test.  Having determined φ through inspection of the partial autocorrelation function 
of tuˆ , (7) can be estimated for all plausible values of d.
 10 Non-linearity is rejected if 
any of the resulting LM-statistics is statistically significant. The optimum value of d is 
then determined on the basis of the highest LM score. 
 
                                                          
10 Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) advise against choosing φ using an information 
criteria such as the Akaike, since this may induce a downward bias.   
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Non-linear debt behaviour can be modelled in two ways. The first, adopted by Sarno 
(2001), is to model directly the debt series. An alternative approach, which we prefer 
because it relates to Bohn’s hypothesis more directly, is to estimate the logistic 
STECM model (L-STECM) described by equations (8)-(11) below:  
 
∆Rt = θ t MLt + (1−θ t) MUt + εt                     (8) 
MLt = α1 + ∑
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Equations (9) and (10) are error-correction models similar to (6). They define two 
fiscal regimes, separated by the regime threshold τ . In line with Bohn’s hypothesis, τ  
corresponds to a critical deficit value above which the deficit is considered by 
authorities to be too large. As long as this threshold is not reached, public revenue is 
adjusted according to MU in (10). In this upper regime the error correction coefficient 
ζU  should either be non-significant (no correction of deficit) or relatively small in 
absolute terms (slow correction of deficit). When the budget deficit surpasses its 
critical threshold value, revenue adjusts according to ML in (9). Bohn’s suggestion 
implies that in this lower regime the error correction coefficient ζL  should be 
statistically significant and relatively large in absolute terms (fast deficit reduction). 
Equation (8) models period-to-period changes in public revenue as a weighted 
average of ML and MU. The regime weight θ is defined in (11) as the probability that 
the transition variable dtu −ˆ  takes a value below the regime threshold. ∆Rt is mainly 
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determined by MU if dtu −ˆ >τ and mainly by ML if dtu −ˆ ≤ τ. The parameter σ  denotes 
the speed of transition between the two regimes. The L-STECM simplifies to the 
linear model in (6) if βLi = βUi and γLi = γUi for all i and ζL= ζU. 
 
2.3. Tests and models of structural breaks in fiscal policy  
 
Standard unit root tests are biased towards rejecting stationarity if the deterministic 
components of the series tested is subject to structural breaks (see Perron, 1989). The 
problem becomes even more complex when the dates of the breaks are unknown. 
Makrydakis et al (1999), who examined public debt sustainability in Greece using the 
discounted debt-to-GDP series, address this issue using the test proposed by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992). This allows for endogenous identification of a single, unknown, 
break point. However, as Figure 1 suggests, Greek fiscal policy may have been 
subject to two breaks. By not accounting for this second possible break, the results 
reported by Makrydakis et al may include biases.  
 
We test for multiple structural breaks in fiscal policy endogenously using the Chi-
square test proposed by Quintos (1995). For this test, the DOLS estimator in equation 
(5) is augmented as suggested by equation (12) below: 
 
Rt = α  + β  Gt + ∑
−=
−∆
k
ki
iti Gγ + δ (DG)t + νt                                                                (12) 
Dt   = 1  if  t ∈  (1,..., T)  
 = 0  if  t ∈  (T+1, ..., N) 
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In (12),  (DG)t is a slope dummy variable, taking the value of Gt up to the date of the 
tested break point (T) and zero afterwards; and N is the last sample observation. The 
test involves estimating (12) consecutively, where following Andrews (1993) we trim 
15% of the initial and final parts of the sample. In each estimation round, the sample 
size remains constant but the definition of (DG) changes: for the first estimation 
round, the last observation in DGt is set to be zero; the rest of the observations are set 
to be equal to Gt. The estimation is repeated, substituting in each estimation round the 
values of Gt by zero backwards. Hence, for the last estimation round, only the first 
observation of DGt takes the value of Gt; all the rest are set to zero. In each estimation 
round we test the statistical significance of the dummy variable. We do so using a 
Wald test, which is χ2 distributed with one degree of freedom. The null hypothesis 
describes structural stability (H0: δ = 0). Structural breaks are identified in those dates 
for which the estimated Wald statistic is higher than the 5% critical value of χ2(1).   
 
If structural breaks are found, the sustainability analysis has to be augmented to 
account for them.  Assuming that the number of structural breaks that have been 
identified is j, the DOLS estimator in (5) takes the form of (13) below:  
 
Rt = α  + β Gt + ∑
=
j
i
iti D
1
δ Gt  + ∑
−=
−∆
k
ki
iti Gγ + vt                                (13)                              
 
In (13), i=1,.., j; Dit  = 0 if t ∈  (1,..., Ti); and Dit = Gt if t (Ti+1, ..., N), where Ti is the 
date in which the ith identified structural break occurs. Equation (13) picks up the 
long-run (total multiplier) effect of structural breaks in fiscal policy. Ceteris paribus, a 
significant and positive (negative) coefficient of slope dummy implies a move 
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towards (away from) debt sustainability. The cointegrating vector augmented for 
structural breaks is given by CVBRt = Rt - α  - β Gt -∑
=
j
i
iti D
1
δ Gt. Debt sustainability is 
consistent with CVBRt being stationary; the β coefficient (adjusted for dummies) 
being equal to one (β+∑
=
=
j
i
i
1
1δ ); and α = 0.   
 
If stationary is not rejected for CVBRt, when (6) is estimated using CVBRt the error 
correction coefficient ζ must be statistically significant. However, it is possible for 
structural breaks to coincide with non-linear fiscal adjustment, in which case ζ will 
not be constant but a function of the value of the budget deficit. Non-linear behaviour 
for CVBRt is a testable hypothesis, which we can test using equation (7). If linearity is 
rejected, the L-STECM model discussed in section 2.2 is re-estimated, using CVBRt 
rather than CVt. By addressing both structural breaks and non-linearities, we expect 
this general model to be the most suitable means of modelling fiscal adjustment.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
3.1. Benchmark tests: Linear analysis without structural breaks 
 
We start by running a number of unit root (ADF) tests, specified to include no 
constant; a constant; and a constant and a trend on the discounted debt series depicted 
in Figure 1. All tests reject stationarity, suggesting non-sustainability for Greek public 
debt.11 We proceed to the second benchmark methodology discussed in section 2.1, 
                                                          
11 To preserve space, these tests are not reported here. These tests, and all other findings to which we 
refer but do not present in this paper, are available by the author upon request.  
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involving cointegration analysis between Rt and Gt. We use data taken from the 
International Financial Statistics Databank of the IMF.12 The data frequency is 
quarterly and covers 1970Q1- 2000Q4.13  Rt includes seignorage, approximated by the 
change in monetary base (M0); Gt includes interest payments. Figure 2 plots the logs 
of Rt and Gt. Both seem to include seasonality, for which we account in our 
estimations. The unit root tests we have run (not reported) suggest that both Rt and Gt 
are I(1).  The series move together in the 1970s but subsequently exhibit a growing 
divergence. Following 1996, co-movement seems to have been restored. Hence, 
Figure 2 is consistent with Figure 1, suggesting fiscal stability in the 1970s, followed 
by a worsening of the fiscal outlook in the 1980s and a partial recovery in the 1990s.  
 
We now estimate (5) using DOLS. In view of the frequency of our data, we set a lag 
and lead order of five (note however that the findings reported below are not sensitive 
to changes of this order). DOLS resulted in autocorrelated residuals, for which we 
corrected using DGLS. The results are reported in Table 1, col. (a). The reported ADF 
statistic soundly rejects the cointegration hypothesis. This suggests that Greek public 
debt is not sustainable. This finding is consistent with the findings obtained by 
Corsetti and Roubini (1991) and Makrydakis et al in (1999).   
 
We now estimate the ECM model in (6). We follow a general-to-specific approach, 
starting with twelve lags for each variable and eliminating at each estimation stage the 
                                                          
12 Our series refer to general government revenue and expenditure. We have calculated real values 
dividing nominal values by the Consumer Price Index. We would have preferred to use a GDP deflator 
series but that was not available for the whole of our sample on a quarterly basis.  
13At the time of writing this paper, International Financial Statistics have not been reporting data for 
Greek government expenditure and revenue for the period following 1998. For the period 1999-2000 
our data is taken from various editions of the Bulletin of Conjunctural Indicators published by the Bank 
of Greece. These series are consistent with those used by IMF and account for the revisions of Greek 
fiscal data for the years 1999-2000 decided by the European Commission in 2003.   
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least significant term.14 The parsimonious equation is reported in Table 2, col (a).15  
The error correction term is statistically significant, suggesting cointegration between 
Rt and Gt. This provides evidence in favour of sustainability and contradicts our 
previous finding. The same contradictory findings are obtained when the 
cointegrating vector is estimated using the Johansen rather than the DGLS estimator. 
To summarise, the benchmark tests leave the question of sustainability of Greek 
public debt open.  
 
3.2. Non-linear analysis without structural breaks  
 
We now test whether the ambiguity of the previous section can be clarified by 
accounting for non-linear debt behaviour. Table 3, col. (a) reports the results of the 
non-linearity tests on CVt. The latter’s partial autocorrelation function (not reported to 
preserve space) suggested a φ value equal to 4. We report LM-scores and their 
associated p-values for values of d = 1…8.  We find strong-evidence of non-linearity, 
with the highest LM-score obtained for d = 1.  
 
Table 2, col. (b) reports the estimates of the short-run (L-STECM) model discussed in 
2.2 using CVt. We adopt a general to specific approach and report the parsimonious 
equation. Although the point-estimate of the error correction term in the lower regime 
                                                          
14 All equations in Table 2 include an intercept dummy, taking the value of 1 for 1997Q4 and zero 
otherwise. This captures the exceptionally high level of public expenditure recorded for that quarter. 
The latter may be related to the speculative attack sustained by the drachma in November 1997. During 
that attack, the Bank of Greece spent a significant amount of its foreign currency reserves. Omitting 
this dummy variable does not change the nature of results reported in Table 2, but results in non-
normally distributed residuals.  
15 Note that this equation, and all equations reported in Table 2, include the current value of ∆logG in 
the set of regressors. The estimations we undertook strongly reject exclusion of this variable from the 
analysis, as its omission creates significant misspecification problems. Its inclusion imposes that 
government expenditure is weakly exogenous in the long-run cointegrating vector. We have tested this 
hypothesis and concluded that it is valid for the period covered by our data set (the results are available 
upon request).  
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is higher in absolute terms than the one in the upper (-0.470 versus -0.257), it is not 
significant. This suggests lack of deficit correction for large deficit values, which is 
consistent with an explosive public debt path. To conclude, when the benchmark 
analysis is augmented by allowing for non-linear debt dynamics but not structural 
breaks in fiscal policy, the sustainability hypothesis for Greek public debt is rejected.   
 
3.3. Linear analysis with structural breaks  
 
We now test for structural breaks in Greek fiscal policy. Figure 3 plots the values of 
the sequentially estimated Chi-square tests given by (12) against the 5 and 1 per cent 
critical values. Structural stability is rejected for a number of observations in the early 
1980s and 1990s. Given that structural breaks in fiscal policy cannot fall too close 
together, we treat all break points falling within three years as representatives of the 
same break. The exact timing of the break is then selected to be the observation 
presenting the highest test value. We identify two structural breaks, in 1980(2) and 
1990(3). Both breaks are consistent with the indications provided by Figures 1 and 2.  
 
As a further robustness check, we apply the second test for structural breaks proposed 
by Quintos (1995), the LR+ test. Its estimation (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), 
confirms the existence of two breaks, now located in 1982(4) and 1991(3). These are 
close to the timing of the breaks identified above. Therefore, we consider the latter to 
be robust. Their timing is at first sight plausible: The first coincides with the well-
documented major fiscal expansion undertaken in Greece the early 1980s. The second 
coincides with the initiation of the convergence programmes implemented in the 
1990s, aiming to secure Greece’s accession to the EMU.  
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We now investigate the effect of the two breaks on Greek public debt. Table 1, col. 
(b) reports the estimates of equation (13). Two findings stand out. The first relates to 
the estimated sign of the two dummy variables. The dummy referring to 1982Q2 has a 
negative and significant sign, suggesting a move away from sustainability in the 
1980s. This finding is not new. The same break has also been identified by 
Makrydakis et al (who place it in 1978); and its negative consequences have been 
extensively debated by authors like Chistodoulakis (1994) and Alogoskoufis (1995). 
By contrast, the dummy referring to 1990Q3 has a positive and statistically significant 
sign. This provides original econometric evidence according to which, starting from 
1990, the convergence programmes implemented by the Greek authorities in the 
1990s have had a positive long-term improvement effect on Greek public debt 
dynamics.16 This finding has not been previously reported in the literature. 
 
The second important finding from Table 1, col. (b) is that accounting for the two 
structural breaks, makes Greek public debt sustainable: At the conventional 5 per cent 
level, the reported ADF statistic is now statistically significant; the β coefficient 
adjusted for dummies (β+δ1+δ2) is not statistically different from unity; and the 
constant term is not statistically different from zero (α=0). The sustainability finding 
is not sensitive to the choice of estimator, as it is still obtained when (13) is estimated 
using the Johansen estimator.17 Further support is provided by the ECM equation 
accounting for breaks: replacing the term CVt-1 with CVBRt-1 in (6) maintains the 
significance of the error correction term (see Table 2, col. c). Overall, when the 
                                                          
16 Using the Johansen estimation methodology, defining the breaks to have taken in 1982(4) and 
1991(3), as suggested by the LR+ test in the Appendix, and restricting the cointegrating rank to one, we 
find the dummy variables to be statistically significant, with point estimates of -0.030 for the 1982(4) 
dummy and 0.022 for the 1991(3) one. 
17 Using the Johansen estimator, and allowing for the structural breaks identified by the LR+ test in the  
Appendix, the point estimate of the β coefficient, when adjusted for dummies, is 0.91. The unity 
restriction for (β+δ1+δ2) is not rejected at the 5 per cent level; and the constant term is not significant.  
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benchmark testing procedure is augmented to allow for multiple structural breaks but 
not non-linear fiscal adjustment, we conclude that Greek public debt is sustainable.  
 
3.4. Non-linear analysis with structural breaks  
 
We now test for fiscal policy sustainability allowing for both structural breaks and 
non-linear fiscal adjustment. We start by testing for non-linear behaviour in CVBRt 
using equation (7). Inspection of the latter’s partial autocorrelation function (not 
reported here) suggests a value for φ  equal to 4. The linearity tests are presented in 
Table 3, col. (b). Linearity is rejected at the 5% level or lower by the overwhelming 
majority of the statistics reported, yielding an optimum d value equal to 4. We thus 
confirm our finding in section 3.2 that fiscal policy in Greece presents non-linear 
behaviour. This finding is new and, as we will see below, has important policy 
implications.  
 
We proceed to estimate the L-STECM model analysed in section 2.2 using CVBRt in 
equations (9) and (10). Our findings are reported in Table 2, col. (d). This passes all 
misspecification tests and by producing the lowest regression standard error out of all 
the four reported equations, has the best regression fit.  It therefore validates our a-
priori expectations that accounting for both structural breaks and non-linear dynamics, 
is the most suitable way to model Greek public debt dynamics.18 
 
As far as the question of sustainability is concerned, the error correction term is now 
significant in both regimes. This confirms the findings obtained in section 3.3, 
                                                          
18 The inclusion of the intercept dummy accounting for 1997Q4 ensures that our non-linear findings are 
not the result of any outlier in the data set. As mentioned earlier, excluding this dummy does not affect 
the nature of our findings but results in non-normally distributed residuals (see footnote 14).   
 18
according to which fiscal policy in Greece is sustainable. This is a new and important 
finding as it stands in contrast with the findings of both Corsetti and Roubini (1991), 
and Makrydakis et al (1999). These studies accounted for zero and a single structural 
break respectively. Our sustainability finding highlights the importance of 
incorporating the full set of breaks into the analysis.  
 
The results reported in the previous section suggest that as long as both structural 
breaks are accounted for into the analysis, the sustainability finding is not sensitive to 
the inclusion of non-linear fiscal dynamics. However, the existence of the latter 
conveys important insights for Greek fiscal policy which cannot be identified in their 
absence. The first relates to Bohn’s hypothesis for which col. (d) in Table 2 provides 
strong evidence in favour of. In the upper regime (MU), the estimated speed of 
adjustment is significant and similar in size (-0.18) to those obtained by the rest of the 
equations reported in Table 2. However, in the lower regime (ML), fiscal adjustment 
is more than three times faster (-0.57) and statistically significant. These suggest that 
Greek fiscal authorities always correct budget deficit but large deficits are corrected 
much faster than small ones. This is a new finding, not captured by previous studies 
on Greece, and also not captured by the short-run model that accounts for structural 
breaks only, ignoring non-linearities (col. c in Table 2).  
  
The second implication relates to the estimated regime threshold. This is negative, 
statistically significant and quite precisely defined at -0.116. The negative sign 
suggests that Greek authorities make no distinction between surpluses and 
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small/medium- size deficits, both of which belong to the upper regime.19 Given that 
the point estimates in Table 1, col. (b) used to calculated CVBRt are not precisely of 
the [1 0 -1] form, this estimated threshold cannot be strictly interpreted as a budget 
deficit of 11.6 per cent of GDP. However, the qualitative policy implication of our 
findings is clear: Greek authorities wait for the budget deficit to assume quite 
significant values before they take determined measures (as suggested by the high 
speed of adjustment in the lower regime), to correct it. This is another new finding, 
previously unreported in the literature, and also not captured by the short-run model 
that accounts for structural breaks only, ignoring non-linearities (col. c in Table 2).   
 
Finally, the third implication relates to forecasts of Greek fiscal variables. Figure 4 
presents the estimates of CVBRt against the estimated threshold value of our preferred 
L-STECM model. Most observations lie in the upper regime. In such periods, using 
the linear model reported in Table 2, col. (c), where the estimated speed of adjustment 
is similar to that of the L-STECM upper regime would not entail high forecasting 
risks. However, for a non-negligible minority of observations, the disequilibrium term 
takes values in the lower regime. In such periods, which correspond to significant 
deterioration of the budget deficit, using the linear model could lead to significantly 
biased fiscal projections. Such biases would not be accounted for had we not added 
non-linearities in the analysis accounting for structural breaks.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Remember that the dependent variable in our long-run model is public revenue Rt. Therefore, the 
disequilibrium term CVBRt = Rt – α − (β+δ1+δ2)×Gt is defined in terms of surplus rather than deficit. A 
negative sign for this disequilibrium term corresponds to a deficit.  
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Compliance of pubic finances with the government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
(ICB) has been rejected by a number of empirical studies. Such findings may include 
biases if they do not allow for the effects of non-linear public debt adjustment and 
structural breaks in fiscal policy. The existing literature has largely overlooked these 
issues. The relatively few studies that address them do so separately. There exists no 
paper testing for their combined effect simultaneously.  
 
We address this gap by focusing on Greece, one of Europe’s most highly indebted 
countries, whose public debt has been found by previous studies to be unsustainable. 
We obtain a number of new and interesting findings. We find evidence of non-linear 
fiscal adjustment, with Greek authorities correcting large deficits faster than small 
ones. We also find evidence of two, rather than the previously reported single, 
structural breaks in Greek fiscal policy, the second of which suggests that the 
convergence programmes implemented in the 1990s have had a beneficial effect on 
Greek public debt. Overall, we find that Greek public debt is sustainable. This stands 
in contrast to the findings of previous studies on Greece. Our analysis highlights the 
risks of bias involved in existing tests of public debt sustainability not accounting for 
the full set of structural breaks and non-linearities in fiscal policy.  
 
The analysis in this paper can be extended towards a number of directions. As a first 
step, one may use the methodological approach employed here to revisit public debt 
sustainability for the USA and other European countries. More specific issues could 
be then be addressed, including the nature of the variables responsible for its existence 
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(e.g. expenditure versus revenue, interest versus non-interest expenditure etc.). 
Finally, empirical findings like the ones obtained in this paper could be used to 
motivate formal modelling of non-linear debt dynamics, for which existing theoretical 
models of fiscal policy, like Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model, have not accounted.  
 
We end with a word of caution. Our main empirical finding, namely that Greek public 
debt is sustainable, should not be interpreted as a sign that Greek authorities have now 
any margin to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy. For reasons mentioned in the 
introduction section, high levels of public debt are regarded to be an obstacle for the 
achievement of sustainable economic growth. The Greek experience confirms these 
theoretical predictions. Following the debt-increasing fiscal-policy shift we found in 
1980, Greece recorded a below-average growth performance. By contrast, since the 
debt-reducing fiscal-policy shift we identified in 1990, Greece has been achieving 
accelerating growth rates. Nevertheless, despite its recent reduction, public debt in 
Greece remains by European standards excessive. This renders the sustainability of 
the recently achieved growth rates fragile. For the latter to be maintained in the long-
term, further debt reduction is an essential pre-requisite.    
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Figure 1: Public debt to GDP in Greece, 1970-2000
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Figure 2: Real government expenditure and revenue in Greece, 1970-2000 (in logs)
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Table 1  
 
Long-run models  (GDLS estimates) 
 
  
(a)  
 
Model without breaks 
 
 
(b) 
  
Model with breaks 
 
   
Constant 0.454 (0.300) 0.331 (0.264) 
logG 0.827 (0.093) 0.872 (0.088) 
D1980Q2×logG  -0.020 (0.008) 
D1990Q3×logG  0.016 (0.005) 
   
ARCH F-test 0.58 [0.68] 0.60 [0.66] 
Norm Chi-sq test 1.40 [0.50] 1.55 [0.46] 
Hetero F-test 0.50 [0.97] 0.82 [0.71] 
   
H0: β = 0 78.9** [0.00]  
H0: β = 1 3.43 [0.06]  
H0: β + δ1 + δ2 = 0  122.6** [0.00] 
H0: β + δ1 + δ2 =1    2.84 [0.09] 
   
Unit root tests on tuˆ  
[95 per cent CV] 
 
-2.39 [-2.89] 
 
-3.42* [-2.89] 
 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets (unless otherwise state); * and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 per cent level respectively  
 
Table 2 
Short-run Error Correction Models  
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 (a) 
Linear without structural breaks 
(b)  
Non-linear  without structural breaks 
(c)  
Linear with structural breaks 
(d)  
Non-linear with structural breaks 
     
  MU  MU 
Constant  0.006 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
∆ logRt-1 -0.480 (0.087) -0.174 (0.051) -0.468 (0.083) -0.400 (0.097) 
∆ logRt-2 -0.365 (0.096)  -0.356 (0.091) 0.057 (0.027) 
∆ logRt-3 -0.369 (0.093)  -0.351 (0.089) -0.397 (0.093) 
∆ logRt-4 0.221 (0.081) 0.459 (0.071) 0.221 (0.078) 0.243 (0.084) 
∆ logG 0.156 (0.033) 0.220 (0.034) 0.181 (0.033) 0.146 (0.041) 
∆ logGt-11 0.110 (0.026) 0.134 (0.024) 0.116 (0.025) -0.487 (0.090) 
∆ logGt-12 0.065 (0.026) 0.090 (0.028) 0.071 (0.025) 0.103 (0.026) 
CVt-1 -0.165 (0.056)** -0.257 (0.063)**   
CVBRt-1   -0.224 (0.058)** -0.180 (0.069)* 
     
  ML  ML 
Constant   -0.045 (0.045)  0.085 (0.016) 
∆ logRt-1    -0.498 (0.143) 
∆ logRt-2  -0.753 (0.170)   
∆ logG  0.201 (0.098)  0.109 (0.055) 
∆ logGt-8    -0.328 (0.075) 
CVt-1  -0.470 (0.284)   
CVBRt-1    -0.567 (0.195)** 
     
τ  -0.131 (0.021)**  -0.116 (0.006)** 
     
σ  10.00 (15.73)  20.00 (31.92) 
     
R2 0.81  0.80 0.82 0.84 
Regression SE (sigma) 0.0354 0.0375 0.0344 0.0339 
     
AR F-test 0.70 [0.62] 1.64 [0.16] 0.61 [0.70] 0.50 [0.77] 
ARCH F-test 1.16 [0.33] 0.64 [0.64] 0.77 [0.54] 1.22 [0.31] 
Norm Chi-Sq Test 0.29 [0.86] 0.08 [0.96] 0.39 [0.82] 0.09 [0.10] 
White Hetero F-test 0.67 [0.87] 0.85 [0.66] 0.58 [0.89] 0.50 [0.95] 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets; * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 per cent level respectively; AR-F tests for autocorrelated residuals; ARCH-F tests for AutoRegressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity; Norm Chi-Sq tests for normally distributed residuals; and White Hetero is White’s tests for heteroscedasticity. All equations are estimated including an intercept dummy for 1997Q4 (see footnote 
14 in the text) 
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Table 3  
 
Linearity tests  
 
   
 (a) (b) 
 Cointegrating Vector 
without breaks (CVt) 
Cointegrating Vector  
with breaks (CVBRt) 
d   
   
1 3.078 (0.001)** 2.834 (0.004)** 
2 2.277 (0.016)* 2.840 (0.003)** 
3 1.273 (0.255) 1.891 (0.049)* 
4 1.602 (0.109) 3.163 (0.001)** 
5 1.533 (0.113) 1.504 (0.123) 
6 2.128 (0.016)* 3.125 (0.001)** 
7 1.184 (0.299) 1.159 (0.319) 
8 2.901 (0.001)** 2.321 (0.011)* 
 
 
Note: The Table reports the F-scores of the LM test in equation (7); p-values are reported in 
parenthesis; * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 per cent level respectively  
 
Figure 3: Chi-square test for fiscal policy breaks
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Figure 4: Fiscal disequlibrium versus fiscal regime threshold 
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APPENDIX  
 
In her 1995 paper Quintos proposes a sequential rank constancy test to determine 
endogenously the existence of structural breaks in cointegrating relationships. In 
Quintos’ notation, consider the case of an n-dimensional I(1) process {Xt} that 
satisfies the following error correction formulation: 
 
∆Xt = µt + Π *j (L) ∆Xt-1 + Π Xt-1 + εt                (A1) 
where µ′ = (µα , µβ ), Π *j (L) = ∑−
=
−Π
1
1
1*
j
i
i
i L  and  Π *i = - ∑
+=
Π
j
il
l
1
for i=1,…, j-1.  
 
The null to be tested is that both the rand and the parameters of Π,  i.e. the number 
and the coefficients of the cointegrating relationships, are stable over time against the 
alternative of up to J structural breaks. More formally: 
 
H q0 :   ρ (Π1)1 = … = ρ (ΠJ+1)J+1   = q       
Π1 = … = ΠJ+1 = Π       
  
H 11 ,.... +Jqqa :  ρ (Π1)1 = q1 , … = ρ (ΠJ+1)J+1   = qJ+1     
  Π1 ≠ … ≠ ΠJ+1 ≠ Π       
 
where 0 ≤ q ≤ n, q is the number of cointegrating relations under the null, and J the 
number of structural shifts assumed to occur at times t = mj + 1 for j=1,..., J.  
 
Quintos proposed to test the null of stability using a likelihood ratio test, denoted as 
LR+, which is a version of Johansen’s (1991) rank test. The LR+ test is given by: 
 
 33
LR+ = T ln (1 - λˆ 1) – p1 ln (1 - λˆ 11)                 (A2) 
 
In (A2), T ln (1 - λˆ 1) and p1 ln (1 - λˆ 11) respectively denote the value of the trace 
statistic when the system is estimated for the whole of the sample (0…T) and for the 
sub-period (0… p1). The test follows a χ 2 distribution with degrees of freedom q 
times n. LR+ is estimated recursively and structural breaks are defined to have taken 
place when the estimated value of LR+ exceeds the critical value.  
 
Figure 1A presents the values of the LR+ test estimated for our sample period 
1970Q1-2000Q4. The estimates are based on the full-sample trace statistic obtained 
by the estimation of a VAR model including Greek real government revenue Rt, real 
expenditure Gt, a constant restricted to the cointegration space and unrestricted 
seasonal dummies. The estimated VAR is of order 6, as suggested by the Akaike 
information criterion and the system-reduction F-tests, and passes all misspecification 
tests.  Following Andrews (1993), we have trimmed 15 per cent from the beginning 
and the end of the sample. We find two structural breaks, in 1982Q4 and 1991Q4. 
These are close to the breaks identified using the Chi-Square test, i.e. 1980Q2 and 
1990Q3. Hence, the two tests of structural breaks provide consistent qualitative 
findings.   
 
Figure A1: LR+ test for fiscal policy breaks 
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